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HD Supply Facilities Maint. v. Bymoen, 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 20 (June 11, 
2009)1 
 
EMPLOYMENT/CONTRACTS- NONCOMPETITION COVENANTS 
 
Summary 
 
 Certified questions from the United States District Court, District of Nevada, arising from 
a action by HD Supply Facilities Maint., Ltd. (“HDS”), seeking enforcement of restrictive 
employment covenants against its former employee, Leif Bymoen (“Bymoen”) and Bymoen’s 
current employer AZ Partsmaster, Inc. (“AZP”).  The questions each relate to whether the 
Nevada rule, set forth by the Nevada Supreme Court in Traffic Control Servs. v. United Rentals,2 
prohibiting the assignment of noncompetition covenants in asset purchase transactions “applies 
when a successor corporation acquires covenants of noncompetition, nonsolicitation, or 
confidentiality as a result of a merger.”   
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court held that the Traffic Control rule of nonassignabiilty does 
not apply when a successor corporation acquires restrictive employment covenants in a merger.   
 
Factual and Procedural History  
 
 HDS is one of the largest maintenance, repair, and operations supplies distribution firms 
in the United States.  The company is the product of two separate mergers. In the first merger, 
Hughes Supply, Inc. acquired Bymoen’s original employer, Century Maintenance Supply, Inc. 
(“Century”).   Hughes then merged with a subsidiary of The Home Depot, Inc. to form HDS. 
 
In his contract with Century, Bymoen entered into covenants of nonsolicitation, confidentiality 
and agreed not to “engag[e] in any business activity, directly or indirectly, whether for profit or 
otherwise, which is similar to or competitive with the business of Century in any market area 
then being served by Century.” The agreement did not contain an assignability clause. 
 
 During the course of the mergers, Bymoen continued in his position as a sales 
representative. Then, on September 22, 2006, Bymoen voluntarily resigned from HDS and took a 
sales position with HDS competitor, AZP. Shortly thereafter Bymoen began soliciting business 
from his former HDS clients.  After learning this, HDS notified AZP that Bymoen was in breach 
of the restrictive covenants contained in his contract with Century.  Despite this, AZP continued 
to employ Bymoen.  Thereafter, HDS filed suit against Bymoen and AZP in federal court 
alleging, inter alia, breach of contract. 
 
 Bymoen moved to dismiss the action relying on Traffic Control because he did not 
strictive covenants. HDS responded that consent to assignment of the re Traffic Control was 
                                                        
1 Summarized by Casey G. Perkins 
2 87 P.3d 1054 (Nev. 2004). 
limited to its facts: prohibition on assignment applied only in asset purchase transactions, and 
further that the rule did not apply to covenants of nonsolicitation and confidentiality.  Finding 
that Traffic Control was not clearly controlling precedent because it did not directly address the 
issue before the court, the federal court certified the questions to the Nevada Supreme Court. 
 
Discussion 
 
Traffic Control’s rule of nonassignability 
 
 In Traffic Control, the Nevada Supreme Court held that an employer in a corporate sale 
could not assign rights under an employee’s covenant not to compete unless there was an 
agreement “negotiated at arm’s length, which explicitly permits assignment and which is 
supported by separate consideration.”3 
 
Limiting Traffic Control 
 
 In limiting the Traffic Control rule, the court focused primarily on employees’ 
contractual rights under the common law, and the distinctions between asset purchases and 
mergers.  
 
 First, the court noted that its decision in Traffic Control was grounded in the common law 
rules governing contractual assignments.  Because “[C]ovenants are ‘personal’ in nature and 
replacing a former employer with another obligee could fundamentally change the nature of an 
employee’s obligation” the court reasoned, employee consent was required before an employer 
could assign a covenant. 4  The court noted that the Traffic Control court further protected 
employee rights by requiring arm’s length negotiations and separate consideration for an 
assignability clause.   In light of this, the court held that the Traffic Control decision stood for the 
general proposition that personal services contracts are not assignable without employee consent. 
 
 Next, the court distinguished mergers from asset purchases.  Citing a Florida Supreme 
Court decision5 the court relied on in Traffic Control, and a recent Nebraska Supreme Court 
decision6 addressing the same issue, the court noted that “[u]nlike in a merger, in which ‘two 
corporations… unite into a single corporate existence’ the acquiring corporation in an asset 
purchase becomes, in effect, a wholly new employer.”7  Further, the court noted that when a 
relevant merger statute exists, covenant assignability is not controversial, and that a majority of 
courts have concluded that “the right to enforce the restrictive covenants of a merged corporation 
 entity.”normally vests in the surviving
                                                       
8  Finally, the court recognized the “hard-and-fast 
 
3 Id. at 1057. 
4 Id.  at 1058-59.  
5 Corporate Express Office Prods. v. Phillips, 847 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 2003) (holding that under Florida’s merger 
statute, “the surviving corporation… assumes the right to enforce a noncompete agreement entered into with an 
employee of the merg[ing] corporation.”). 
6 Aon Consulting v. Midlands Financial, 748 N.W. 2d 626 (Neb. 2008)(holding that a nonsolicitation covenant is a 
corporate asset that passes to the successor corporation by operation of law).  
7 HD Supply Facilities Maint. v. Bymoen, 125 Nev. Ad. Op. No. 20, 9 (2009) (quoting Corporate Express, 847 So. 
2d at 412-14).  
8 Id. at 10. 
distinction” it has historically recognized between mergers, which are governed by statute, and 
asset purchases, which are not.9   
 
This distinction was critical to the court.  Because a corporate merger, unlike an asset 
purchase, did not place an employee under the control of an entirely new employer, the court 
held that the reasoning present in Traffic Control does not apply to corporate mergers. 
Accordingly,  “Traffic Control’s rule of nonassignability does not apply when a successor 
corporation acquires restrictive employment covenants as a result of the merger.”10 
 
Concurring Opinion 
 
Justice Pickering concurred in the result and, but for the stare decisis respect due Traffic 
Control, would have analyzed the question under NRS 613.200(4) which provides that restrictive 
covenants in employment agreements are enforceable so long as “the agreement is supported by 
valuable consideration and is otherwise reasonable in scope and duration. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Court concluded that Traffic Control’s rule of nonassignability of restrictive employment 
covenants does not apply when a successor corporation acquires the restrictive covenants as the 
result of a merger, rather than an asset purchase transaction.  
                                                        
9 Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 454 P.2d 24, 26 ev. 1969). (N
10 HD Supply, 125 Nev. Adv. Op. at 11.  
